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DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS OF THE 




In the past, when a nonpublic corporation sought shareholder approval for a 
fundamental change (such as a merger), it would provide a notice of the 
meeting stating its purpose and, if applicable, a statement regarding dissenters’ 
appraisal rights. That is all the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) 
required,1 and corporations generally paid little attention to a so-called “duty of 
disclosure” requiring them to provide additional information to shareholders, if 
such a duty even existed. Of course, in the case of public corporations subject to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) proxy rules, federal law 
mandated extensive disclosure.2 
Times have changed. Now, even corporations that are not subject to the 
SEC’s proxy rules may have to provide robust disclosure under state law. 
Indeed, in some cases, state law requires public corporations to provide even 
more disclosure than is mandated by the SEC’s proxy rules.3 This change has 
taken place primarily as a result of the development of the corporate common 
law, although there have been some statutory developments, including those 
under the MBCA. The development of disclosure requirements through 
decisional law rather than through statutory prescriptions highlights the 
important question of when corporate law should be codified legislatively and 
when it should be left to case-by-case judicial development. The American Bar 
Association’s Committee on Corporate Laws (“the Committee”) confronted 
this question when considering disclosure requirements as part of its continuing 
evaluation of the MBCA. 
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 1. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(d) (2008). 
 2. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-17 (2010) (amending Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-
101). 
 3. See, e.g., Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS, 2010 WL 
1931084 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010); Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
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II 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Historically, corporate statutes provided little guidance on the disclosures 
required when seeking shareholder approval. There was the notice of meeting, 
stating the meeting’s purpose so that shareholders were alerted to the subject 
matter to be considered. If the matter triggered appraisal rights, the 
shareholders would have to be informed of those rights and the procedure to 
assert them. Little more was required under these statutes. 
Similarly, corporate statutes typically did not mandate that information 
about the corporation be provided to shareholders on a regular basis, except in 
situations where corporate action required shareholder approval. Rather, 
shareholders were left to rely on their inspection rights and, beginning in 1960, 
the ability under the MBCA to request the corporation’s available, recent 
financial statements.4 It was not until 1978 that the MBCA required the 
corporation to provide annual financial statements to shareholders.5 
This state corporation-law disclosure regime can be contrasted with the 
federal securities-law regime under which public companies—by statute and 
SEC regulations—are required to provide detailed information on a regular 
basis and in connection with shareholder actions. For example, companies 
subject to the SEC’s reporting requirements must electronically file with the 
SEC an annual report, quarterly reports, and current reports covering specified 
events. Companies subject to the SEC’s proxy rules are required to provide 
annual reports with financial statements and certain other information to 
shareholders. If corporate action is being taken by shareholders—including 
election of directors, approval of equity-compensation plans, or approval of 
fundamental changes like amendments or mergers—additional information, 
including transaction-specific information, is required. 
Beginning about thirty years ago, the courts—especially in Delaware—
began to focus on the inability of shareholders to effectively exercise their 
voting franchise if they were not given adequate information. This translated 
into a duty for directors, operating under traditional standards of care and 
loyalty, to ensure that shareholders received adequate disclosure so that they 
might properly exercise their voting rights on an informed basis. This duty of 
disclosure was first articulated in the context of controlling shareholder 
transactions.6 Over the years, the nature and scope of the duty has been further 
developed and expanded by the courts—particularly in Delaware—and that 
development continues to this day. 
 
 4. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 46 ¶ 5 (1960). 
5.  Id. § 52 ¶ 5 (1979). 
 6. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). 
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III 
THE COMMITTEE REVISITS MBCA DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 
At the same time, there was little statutory change—with some exceptions. 
In 2006, the Committee began to look at what changes to the MBCA might be 
desirable to address disclosure requirements.7 As noted above, the MBCA 
already provided for certain information to be available to shareholders upon 
request, and for limited financial information to be provided annually. The 
MBCA did not, however, require any specific information to be furnished in 
connection with corporate actions requiring shareholder approval, and it 
required only limited information well into the process of exercising appraisal 
rights.8 
Through a task force co-chaired by Justice Jack Jacobs of the Delaware 
Supreme Court and this author, the Committee considered the extent to which 
it should modify the disclosure requirements in the MBCA. It first considered 
whether the information required to be provided to shareholders under section 
16.20 should be expanded, and concluded that no change was necessary. It then 
considered the disclosures required when seeking shareholder approval, or 
when appraisal rights were available. In particular, the Committee considered 
whether any codification of the disclosure requirements was desirable. 
One alternative the Committee considered was to prescribe a list of 
required information, similar to the SEC’s proxy rules. The Committee chose 
not to take that approach under a statute designed to be fundamentally 
enabling. There were several reasons. First, there are a myriad of circumstances 
requiring various levels of disclosure—a one-size-fits-all, prescriptive statutory 
approach would be impractical. Second, unlike the SEC’s proxy rules, which 
can be easily amended and administratively interpreted, legislation is much 
more rigid and inflexible. Also, necessary disclosure is not a static concept. It 
evolves over time as new issues surface—consider, for example, identification of 
enterprise risk—and, absent administrative delegation, there is no mechanism 
for adaptation. The use of a general “materiality” catch-all did not seem 
appropriate as a statutory approach because of the uncertainty it would create 
regarding compliance. In addition, the Committee did not want to replicate a 
disclosure regime that already existed under SEC rules for public companies, 
and it did not want to impose a similar regime on nonpublic companies. 
Instead, the Committee took a more modest approach. First, it added to the 
statute some basic, generally applicable disclosure requirements.9 Second, in the 
official comment relating to director duties, the Committee identified the ability 
 
 7. See infra notes 9 and 10. 
 8. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.20 (2008). 
 9. See Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments Relating to Chapters 8 and 13, 61 BUS. LAW. 1191, 1191 
(2006) [hereinafter Comm. on Corporate Laws, Proposed Amendments 2006]. 
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of the courts to continue developing disclosure requirements as a matter of 
corporate common law.10 
Specifically, in 2007, the Committee amended the MBCA to require that the 
financial information provided under section 13.24—which applies at the time 
of the appraisal payment—also be provided under section 13.20—which applies 
at the time that notice of the availability of appraisal rights is given11—since this 
earlier time is when shareholders must decide whether to preserve their 
appraisal rights. In addition, the required annual financial information was tied 
more-closely to the information required under section 16.20.12 
The Committee decided not to specify in the statute what information must 
be provided at the time of shareholder action. Instead, it recognized—in the 
official comment to section 8.30 (director duties)—that some courts have found 
a duty of disclosure owed by directors to shareholders in some circumstances, 
and that, rather than codifying a duty of disclosure in the MBCA, any such duty 
should be developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, the official 
comment to section 13.20(d) recognizes that, although certain financial 
information must be provided, additional information may be required 
depending upon applicable case law. 
IV 
DECISIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE 
Delaware provides a good example of the case-by-case development of the 
duty of disclosure. Although Delaware is not necessarily typical due to its well-
developed body of corporate decisional law, the significance of Delaware’s 
corporate decisions extends well beyond its borders into MBCA states, which 
look to Delaware for guidance.13 
Although there are earlier disclosure cases, the modern Delaware duty-of-
disclosure era can be dated to the 1977 Delaware Supreme Court decision in 
Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.14 In Lynch, the court found disclosure failures in 
a majority shareholder’s going private tender offer. This was followed by 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,15 in which there was a failure to disclose material 
inside information when soliciting shareholder approval for the merger of a 
subsidiary into the parent. Both of these cases—as well as some later cases, like 
In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litigation16—involved conflict-of-interest 
 
 10. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act—Amendments Relating to Chapters 8 and 13, 62 BUS. LAW. 1061, 1061 (2007). 
 11. Id. at 1062–63. 
 12. Comm. on Corporate Laws, Proposed Amendments 2006, supra note 9, at 1191. 
 13. See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act 1 (Northwestern 
Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 10-04, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677400. 
 14. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). 
 15. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 16. 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993). 
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transactions by controlling shareholders, and thus were grounded in breaches of 
the duty of loyalty.17 
The duty of disclosure soon became unlinked from its loyalty base in cases 
like Smith v. Van Gorkom18 and Zirn v. VLI Corp.,19 and has remained unlinked 
since, having taken root as part of a director’s fiduciary duty.20 The breadth of 
this duty is found in the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement, in Stroud v. 
Grace,21 that fiduciary duty requires directors to disclose all material 
information within their control when they seek shareholder action. Stroud 
involved shareholder approval of charter amendments in which proxies were 
not solicited. A limited expansion of the Stroud rule can be found in Malone v. 
Brincat22 in which the court held that directors can be liable for knowingly 
providing false information to shareholders, even without seeking shareholder 
action. However, the nature of that duty differs from the duty of disclosure 
dealt with by the Committee since it is not based upon shareholder actions, 23 
and thus not easily subject to statutory treatment. 
The vitality of Delaware’s application of the duty of disclosure is found in a 
series of decisions in 2007 and some more-recent cases.24 The 2007 cases were 
Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Crawford,25 In re 
Netsmart Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,26 In re The Topps Co. 
Shareholders Litigation,27 and In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation.28 In each, 
the chancery court enjoined acquisition transactions until corrective disclosure 
was made to shareholders. More-recent examples in which disclosure issues 
were considered by the court are In re Cogent, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,29 and 
Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc.30 In these decisions, the 
Delaware Chancery Court approached disclosure issues from the perspective of 
satisfying fiduciary duties as they relate to corporate governance—namely, the 
ability of shareholders to exercise their voting franchise on an informed basis. A 
 
 17. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary 
Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1100 (1996). 
 18. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 19. 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993). 
 20. See Jack B. Jacobs, The Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure After Dabit, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 391, 
397–98 (2007). 
 21. 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). 
 22. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
 23. See Holly M. Barbera, Note, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations: Resolving Questions 
After Malone v. Brincat, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L 563, 563 (2001). 
 24. See generally Lloyd L. Drury III, Private Equity and the Heightened Fiduciary Duty of 
Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 33 (2009). 
 25. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 26. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 27. In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 28. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 29. In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5780-VCP, 2010 WL 3894991 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2010). 
 30. Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., No. 5402-VCS, 2010 WL 1931084 (Del. 
Ch. May 13, 2010). 
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similar perspective has been applied in a number of cases involving the ability 
of shareholders to exercise appraisal rights on an informed basis.31 For example, 
in Berger v. Pubco Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court fashioned a “quasi-
appraisal” remedy when the parent failed to disclose to the minority 
shareholders—who had to decide whether to assert appraisal rights—how it set 
the share price in a short-form cash-out merger.32 These decisions reflect the 
court’s concern about disclosure issues surrounding conflicts of interest (such as 
banker’s fees and management participation), bases of valuation used by 
financial advisers, and financial projections available to the board and 
interested parties. For example, in the recent Maric decision, the court found 
the disclosure in a private-equity buyout inadequate in the following respects: 
(1) the description of how the investment bank  calculated the discount rate for 
its discounted cash flow valuation when rendering its fairness opinion; (2) the 
use of selective projections regarding the target’s future performance, with the 
omission of the free cash flow estimates provided to the investment bank for 
use in its valuation analysis; and (3) mischaracterization of the discussions 
between management and the buyer regarding future employment and equity 
arrangements.33 
The ability to deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis provides 
flexibility to decide what disclosures are relevant given the type of transaction 
involved, and to assess the materiality of information in that context. The ability 
to grant injunctive relief—as opposed to assessing individual damages—has 
allowed courts to take a pragmatic approach to obtain corrective disclosure 
when necessary to avoid interfering with the ability of shareholders to make an 
informed decision about whether to approve a transaction.34 
This flexibility has a corresponding downside: It increases the indeterminacy 
of Delaware corporation law and leads to less predictability and reliability.35 
Furthermore, it may be one thing to accept this indeterminacy in Delaware 
courts, given their experience, expertise, and sophistication with corporate law 
matters, but another to deal with it in courts that do not meet those standards. 
Nevertheless, some measure of indeterminacy is the necessary price of a 
principles-based common-law process that depends on context, in contrast to 
detailed and prescriptive codification.36 The Committee’s decision to take a 
case-by-case approach to disclosure requirements depended in part on the need 
 
 31. See, e.g., Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132 (Del. 2009); Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 
A.2d 112 (Del. 1992); Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80 (Del. Ch. 2004); Turner v. Bernstein, 776 
A.2d 530 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 32. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 142–44. 
 33. See Maric, 2010 WL 1931084, at *1–2. 
 34. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360–62 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 35. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–48 (2009) (describing, among other things, a series of “surprises” in 
the Delaware courts from 1983 to 2007). 
 36. See Robert B. Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal–State Corporate 
Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 176 (2009). 
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ultimately to vest confidence in the courts to properly address these issues. The 
willingness of courts outside Delaware to look to Delaware precedents for 
guidance helped the Committee to make that decision. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The Committee’s actions regarding disclosure requirements demonstrate 
the ability of the MBCA to adapt to changing developments in the law. They 
also demonstrate the importance of determining when, and to what extent, 
statutory codification is appropriate, and when certain matters—because of 
their complexity, variability, and dependence on specific facts and 
circumstances—are better left to judicial determination on a case-by-case basis. 
 
